Entry by Birth Alone?: Rawlsian Egalitarianism and the Basic Right to Invite by Lindauer, Matthew
	 1 
 
Entry by Birth Alone?:  
Rawlsian Egalitarianism and the Basic Right to Invite* 
 
Matthew Lindauer 
Brooklyn College, City University of New York 
 
Forthcoming in Social Theory and Practice 
 
Abstract:  This paper argues that citizens have a basic right to invite family members 
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 Rawls imposes a key assumption in the original position.  Call it “the Closedness 
Assumption.”  In A Theory of Justice1 he characterizes it as follows: 
 
“Let us assume, to fix ideas, that a society is a more or less self-sufficient 
association of persons who in their relations to one another recognize certain rules 
																																																								
* Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Australian National University 
School of Philosophy Seminar and the Yale Works in Progress Seminar.  For comments 
and discussion, I would like to thank Geoff Brennan, Devon Cass, Bob Goodin, Joy 
Gordon, Henning Hahn, Alex King, Yao Lin, Claudio López-Guerra, Emily McTernan, 
Shmuel Nili, Knox Peden, Peter Singer, and Nic Southwood.  For written comments, I 
am grateful to Christian Barry, Steve Darwall, Serene Khader, Josh Knobe, R.J. Leland, 
Sara Protasi, Daniel Putnam, Julian Reid, Barbara Sattler, Jiewuh Song, Zoltán Gendler 
Szabó, Saam Trivedi, and two anonymous reviewers for this journal. 
1 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1971/rev. 
1999).  “TJ” hereafter.  All citations herein refer to the revised edition. 
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of conduct as binding and who for the most part act in accordance with them.” 
(TJ, p. 4) 
 
“I shall be satisfied if it is possible to formulate a reasonable conception of justice 
for the basic structure of society conceived for the time being as a closed system 
isolated from other societies.” (Ibid., p. 7) 
 
In his later works, Rawls retains this working assumption,2 and characterizes these closed 
societies as political states that persons “enter…only by birth and leave…only by death.”3  
The assumption is supposed to help us “fix ideas,” restricting our subject matter to 
principles of domestic justice which, for Rawls, are the principles that members of a 
single society will agree to.  By focusing on agreement between these individuals under 
the Closedness Assumption, Rawls suggests, we can pursue discussions of domestic 
justice in a more tractable way.4  It is consistent with Rawls’ methodology here that we 
may then modify the principles of domestic justice once we begin to consider a society 
existing among others, although he notably moves on to principles of international justice 
rather than adjusting his conception of domestic justice, “justice as fairness,” to address 
such circumstances. 
																																																								
2 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), “PL” 
hereafter, and John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), “JAFR” hereafter. 
3 PL, p. 12. 
4 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on the role that the 
Closedness Assumption is meant to play in Rawls’ theorizing about domestic justice. 
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 I want to distinguish between two importantly different parts of the Closedness 
Assumption that are easily run together, and separating them suggests that a different 
methodology from the one that Rawls actually employed may be promising.  There are 
two notions of closedness that are worth keeping apart, which I will call “Physical 
Closedness” and “Normative Closedness” to highlight their main differences: 
 
Physical Closedness: All persons are born in and die in the same society, and have 
no contact with or relations to persons in other societies. 
Normative Closedness: All and only members of society are represented in the 
agreement on the public conception of justice. 
 
Physical Closedness characterizes the people and the territory that our discussion is 
restricted to.  Normative Closedness, by contrast, focuses on the people who are 
participants in the domestic social contract.  These notions are distinct.  If you adopt 
Physical Closedness, of course, it would be odd not to also adopt Normative Closedness, 
because if the people you have in mind are stipulated to have no contact or relations with 
other persons in other societies whatsoever, it is not clear why they would need to agree 
on principles of justice with these other persons.  An agreement among themselves would 
seem to be sufficient.  However, one may adopt Normative Closedness, restricting their 
focus to domestic justice principles––which are to be the subject of agreement among 
insiders––and this is fully compatible with removing the assumption of Physical 
Closedness.  We may then consider how the agreement between insiders is impacted by 
the existence of, contact with, and any significant relations they bear to outsiders. 
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 As we know, some citizens of liberal democracies are in close relationships with 
non-citizens.  Among the closest of these relationships are parent-child and spousal 
relationships, which inform the most central aspects of their conceptions of the good.  So 
if we want our public conception of justice to appropriately include these citizens, we 
should try to work out the implications of Normative Closedness without Physical 
Closedness.  I take up this task here, restricting my focus to family reunification.  I argue 
that removing Physical Closedness while leaving Normative Closedness in place has 
surprising implications that are nonetheless consistent with the intention behind the 
Closedness Assumption of generating a wieldy and plausible conception of domestic 
justice.  In particular, I argue that this methodological tweak has the implication that a 
new basic right, a “right to invite,” must be regarded as a commitment of Rawlsian 
domestic justice.5 
 As noted, I will not question Rawls’ commitment to Normative Closedness for the 
purposes of this paper.  I thus leave aside the debate over whether he should have 
extended the original position to cover interactions between persons on a global scale.  
Prominent critics working in both the ethics of immigration6 and political philosophy 
more broadly7 have argued for this conclusion.  Rawls famously rejected this move in his 
																																																								
5 For a different proposal regarding a right to invite outsiders, see Claudio López-Guerra, 
“Immigration, Membership, and Justice: On the Right to Bring Others into the Polity,” in 
Difference without Domination, eds. Danielle Allen and Rohini Somanathan (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, forthcoming). 
6 Joseph H. Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders,” Review of 
Politics, 49 (1987), pp. 251-273. 
7 Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1973); Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1989). 
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later work on international justice, The Law of Peoples.8  This debate raises important 
questions about global political institutions and international distributive justice, among 
others.  One important upshot of my argument here is that we don’t have to address such 
questions to see that Rawls’ egalitarian theory of domestic justice (henceforth “Rawlsian 
egalitarianism”) has important implications for how societies should treat at least some 
people seeking to immigrate. 
 A second important upshot of this paper is that Rawlsian egalitarianism can 
vindicate some of our deepest commitments about immigration justice.  Immigration has 
become a central topic in political philosophy in recent years.  Political philosophers have 
largely rejected Rawls’ view that immigration doesn’t hold much in the way of 
independent theoretical interest.  He famously thought that issues of immigration would 
fall away if most societies became reasonably just.9  Most of us think that this is false – 
people have interests in being able to migrate that have little to do with suffering 
injustices at home.  Further, even if Rawls’ conditional claim were true, the antecedent – 
all societies being reasonably just – is so far-off that it wouldn’t lead many of us think 
that the we shouldn’t devote considerable attention to the moral issues raised by 
immigration.  However, insofar as one thinks there is value in the Rawlsian project, my 
argument shows that Rawls’ own framework commits him to giving an important place 
																																																								
8 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).  
“LP” hereafter.  Rawls holds that representatives of peoples, rather than representatives 
of individual persons, should be the parties in original position thought experiments at the 
international level.  He focuses on describing two international original positions, one 
where representatives of liberal peoples agree to a Law of Peoples consisting of eight 
principles, and a second one where representatives of decent hierarchical peoples agree to 
the same set of principles. 
9 LP, pp. 8-9. 
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to matters of immigration, in particular the issue of family reunification.  Those of us 
who take immigration seriously as an area of philosophical investigation may therefore 
have more reason to think that Rawlsian egalitarianism is a compelling framework for 
thinking about justice than if we took Rawls’ own views on immigration at face value. 
 Additionally, while immigration is regularly discussed in political philosophy, it 
is often treated in isolation from other issues of justice.  More work must be done to think 
about how our moral commitments involving immigration should fit into a broader theory 
of liberal egalitarianism and be balanced with our other moral commitments.  Rawlsian 
egalitarianism is one of the major liberal egalitarian frameworks, and has been used to 
develop important arguments for open borders10 and equal treatment of gay and straight 
couples by a society’s immigration policy regime.11  I will argue that a right to 
reunification is as basic a right for liberal citizens as other recognized basic rights, such 
as freedom of speech, on the basis of Rawlsian liberal commitments.  Establishing this 
conclusion is part of the broader project of examining liberal commitments regarding 
immigration, and how different approaches to thinking about liberal justice can be used to 
address moral issues concerning migration. 
  
 
 
 
																																																								
10 Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders.” 
11 Matthew J. Lister, “A Rawlsian Argument for Extending Family-Based Immigration 
Benefits to Same-Sex Couples,” The University of Memphis Law Review, Vol. 37 
(Summer 2007), pp. 745-780. 
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1. JAF, JAF*, and the Basic Right to Invite 
 
 As I suggested above, it may be fruitful to consider how justice as fairness 
(hereafter “JAF”) has been shaped by the assumption of Physical Closedness, and 
whether it is therefore incomplete in any important way for the actual liberal democratic 
societies that Rawls means for it to be used in.  If we remove the assumption of Physical 
Closedness, representatives in the original position can take the fact that at least some 
members are likely to be in important relationships with non-members into account. 
 Representatives of members are now considering what principles of justice to 
secure for them in the original position, with the knowledge that these members may be 
in important relationships with non-members.  In such a situation, these representatives 
would guarantee a basic “right to invite” for members of society within Rawls’ first 
principle of justice.  They would reject JAF, in other words, for JAF*, an extended 
version of JAF that includes a basic right to invite certain non-members – the ones with 
whom members they represent may be in important relationships, such as parent-child 
relationships and marital relationships – into the society with the security that co-
membership makes possible. 
 Why would these representatives be so adamant about including a basic right to 
invite parents, children, and spouses for their clients?  Consider the difference it would 
make in their lives if members weren’t able to bring in these persons to live with them on 
the secure basis that co-membership in a society affords.  This will not only be highly 
desirable but urgent in many cases, such as when widowed elderly parents need care or 
two people are married and prepared to start a life together.  The representatives are 
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behind the veil of ignorance in the original position, and so do not know which member 
of society they represent, including whether the member bears ties to non-members 
whom it is important to be able to bring into the society.  With the choice between JAF 
and JAF* as alternative public conceptions of justice, representatives of members in the 
modified original position12 would choose JAF* for their clients, which includes a basic 
right to invite within the first principle of justice. 
 Of course, I’ve presented the argument for the right to invite somewhat 
schematically so far.  To be sure that representatives would choose JAF* over JAF, I’ll 
need to say more about the content of this right.  I’ll also have to discuss how the 
modified first principle fits into a broader Rawlsian egalitarian conception of justice.  But 
before addressing these issues, it is worth pausing to say a bit more about why we should 
examine what principles would be agreed to when the assumption of Physical Closedness 
is lifted.   
Rawls acknowledges that the closed society that he envisions when constructing 
JAF is a “considerable abstraction.”  Onora O’Neill objects to this description and points 
out that, strictly speaking, abstractions omit and bracket facts that are true of the matter 
from which they abstract. 13  The idea of a closed society, she notes, assumes predicates 
that are false for all existing human societies, and is thus better described as an 
idealization.  O’Neill makes this point for a very different purpose, which is to critically 
assess the implications of this idealization for Rawls’ account of public reason in 
																																																								
12 Going forward I refer to the original position as already having the assumption of 
Physical Closedness removed for ease of exposition, unless explicitly stated otherwise. 
13 Onora O’Neill, “Political Liberalism and Public Reason: A Critical Notice of John 
Rawls, Political Liberalism,” Philosophical Review, Vol. 106, No. 3 (1997). 
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comparison with that of Kant, but it is also useful to consider here.  Rather than leaving 
out facts about real societies, Physical Closedness treats false predicates about the kind of 
society that Rawls wants his public conception of justice to order as if they were true, in 
particular that all of the citizens are born and die there and have no contact with or 
relations to people outside of the society. 
Rawls could respond that idealization can be appropriate to a theoretical exercise 
if it produces some benefits, and is a common feature in philosophy and other fields of 
inquiry.  In physics, the universe is represented as frictionless for the sake of constructing 
theories of mechanics, and in economics homo economicus represents an idealized 
rational actor with properties that human beings do not possess.  Each of these 
idealizations just mentioned advances the goal of theorists making those idealizations 
when they are appropriate.  Newtonian mechanics flourishes with its realm of importance 
in physics despite the assumption of zero friction.  It is more controversial that economics 
can derive descriptively adequate pictures of economic behaviors using the assumption of 
homo economicus, but that is at least the claim of proponents of that assumption’s use.  
By analogy, Rawls might claim that we are better able to get a first approximation of a 
public conception of justice using the assumption of Physical Closedness that we can 
adjust later to take into account the ways that societies are not closed off to one another. 
 It is entirely open to Rawls to claim that he is developing a theory of domestic 
justice with this simplifying assumption in place to make his task more tractable, and that 
it is possible to later revise the theory by considering relations between societies.  But 
Rawls never did consider relationships between citizens and non-citizens in theorizing 
about the principles of justice that obtain at the international level.  Nor did he revise his 
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theory of domestic justice to take into account how these relationships bear on the 
interests of citizens.  Further, the question of how Rawlsian egalitarianism should handle 
relationships between citizens and non-citizens has yet to be given sustained attention in 
the wide literature on Rawls’ work.14 
 More importantly, since Rawls does want his theory of domestic justice to be 
capable of being accepted by citizens of actual democratic societies, it is worth 
examining the implications of relaxing the assumption of Physical Closedness, allowing 
the parties access to the simple fact that some citizens are in important relationships with 
non-citizens.  If we can show that this task proves tractable, we will avoid unnecessarily 
treating these relationships as extra factors that will or will not, as the case may be, wind 
up being integrated into the public conception of justice.  As I have argued, the right to 
invite should be part of the Rawlsian public conception of justice and its package of basic 
rights and liberties that representatives in the original position accept.  By leaving the 
assumption of Physical Closedness in place, the ability to bring in parents, children, and 
spouses is kept apart from a core question in domestic justice theory as Rawls 
understands it, namely what public conception of justice would be chosen in the original 
position.  One could, of course, just assert that the right to invite doesn’t matter enough to 
be considered here, but this simply begs the question against my argument.  The 
assumption of Physical Closedness postpones the question of the right to invite, and in 
that sense treats it as a less important issue of domestic justice.  Once we lift this 
																																																								
14 For an important exception, see Lister, “A Rawlsian Argument for Extending Family-
Based Immigration Benefits to Same-Sex Couples.” 
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assumption, we arrive at just the opposite view about the centrality of the right to invite 
in a plausible conception of justice. 
 I should emphasize that the issues that are not covered in the selection of the 
public conception of justice, in Rawls’ framework, can never have as central a place in 
the creation and reform of the basic structure as those that are.  They can be brought in 
only at later stages where the public conception of justice is drawn upon in creating a 
constitution, where specific laws and policies are agreed to that realize its principles, and 
where judges and administrators apply these laws and policies to particular cases.15  Part 
of the reasoning for including the basic rights and liberties within the first principle of 
justice is to take them off the table for negotiation in these later stages.  We inherently 
treat the right to bring in parents, children, and spouses as less important than the other 
rights in the first principle if we relegate this right to later stages where it is uncertain 
whether or not it will be implemented.  For immigrant families that have been torn apart 
by circumstances, and couples that cannot live as spouses in societies where their sexual 
orientation or other aspects of themselves are not welcome, Rawlsian egalitarianism can 
provide an answer – you should have a basic guarantee that you can bring in your 
parents, children, or spouses.  On the basis of Rawlsian reasoning, a just democratic order 
must provide this guarantee as a central commitment of domestic justice.  So it appears 
that the assumption of Physical Closedness gets our theorizing about domestic justice off 
on the wrong foot, at least with respect to the centrality of family reunification to 
domestic justice in modern democratic societies, in which many citizens do in fact have 
parents, children, and spouses who are non-citizens that they wish to bring in.  We should 
																																																								
15 For Rawls’ discussion of the four-stage sequence, see TJ, pp. 171-6. 
	 12 
therefore take up the project of examining what Rawlsian egalitarianism requires when 
this assumption is lifted.  On my view, a basic right to invite certain persons into one’s 
society on the stable basis that co-membership affords will be required.  I now turn to 
examine the nature and extent of this right. 
 
2. The Nature and Extent of the Basic Right to Invite 
 
 The right to invite, like the other rights and liberties in Rawls’ first principle, 
should be understood as a right against the state and not individual persons.  The 
correlative duty of the state is not to prevent the exercise of this right by individual 
citizens and to set up the appropriate institutions through which the right may be 
exercised.  While other individual members of society may play a role in restricting or 
violating a fellow member’s right to invite, as with the right to free speech or the right to 
vote in political elections, it is the state’s duty to rectify such violations. 
 How extensive is the right to invite?  In other work, I argue that societies should 
take on a legal obligation to allow non-members who are in certain types of morally 
significant relationships with members in.16  They are legally obligatory “unification 
admissions,”17 non-members seeking admission for the purpose of living in the same 
																																																								
16 Matthew Lindauer, “In Defense of a Category-Based System for Unification 
Admissions,” Journal of Moral Philosophy, Vol. Vol. 15, No. 5 (2018), pp. 572-598.  Of 
course, as with the argument for the right to invite, this argument does not imply that 
societies are obligated to allow in non-members who are terrorists or members of 
criminal organizations.  Genuine concerns for national security and public safety can 
provide reasons to restrict family reunification in particular cases.  I am grateful to an 
anonymous reviewer for mentioning this point. 
17 I prefer the term ‘unification’ to ‘reunification’ in general because, while the latter is 
more commonly used, there are some cases in which people have not lived in the same 
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society as members on the stable basis that membership affords.  While on a case-by-case 
basis relationships of different types may vary in their relative moral importance, a 
feasible immigration policy regime cannot treat all equally significant relationships as 
requiring societies to commit to allowing persons in.18  I don’t have the space here to 
fully argue for this point, but my own view is that societies should treat parents, non-
adult unmarried children, and spouses of members, properly specified, as legally 
obligatory unification admissions and commit to insuring that these persons can 
immigrate.  This category includes non-biological parents and children of members.  
These non-members must be taken in unless very pressing reasons can be given for 
keeping them out.  Limiting the category of legally obligatory unification admissions to 
these persons, I’ve argued, will be feasible and compatible with the other responsibilities 
and moral constraints that societies are subject to in immigration.19 
 In order not to be disadvantaged in the global economy, societies must leave room 
for at least some skilled workers to be admitted.  They may also have asylum seekers 
arriving and requesting refugee status, and they have moral and international legal 
																																																								
society as, or even met, their family members. They may nonetheless still have important 
claims to bring these persons in. Where I use the term ‘reunification’ in this paper, I do so 
only for ease of exposition. 
18 For a contrasting view, see Luara Ferracioli, “Family Migration Schemes and Liberal 
Neutrality: A Dilemma,” Journal of Moral Philosophy, Vol. 13, No. 5 (2016), pp. 553-
575. 
19 The focus on these family relationships does, of course, reflect the value typically 
given to the family in modern liberal democracies.  As I argue in previous work, the 
importance of these relationships could change over time, leading to a change in the 
relationships that are most in need of unification (Lindauer, “In Defense of a Category-
Based System for Unification Admissions”).  In such circumstances, the content of the 
right to invite could be reconsidered, but it is unlikely that it would not be crucially 
important for at least some citizens to bring in some other persons, and hence unlikely 
that a right to invite should be removed from the first principle altogether.  I am grateful 
to an anonymous reviewer for mentioning this point. 
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obligations to take these persons in and determine their statuses.  By restricting the 
category of legally obligatory unification admissions to parents, non-adult unmarried 
children, and spouses of members, societies can ensure that immigration flows are not 
entirely exhausted by unification admissions, and retain the ability to take these other 
persons in.  Of course, the point here is that the right to invite can be restricted when 
doing so is required by the demands of feasibility and the other responsibilities that a 
society must uphold.  If these demands and responsibilities can be upheld while putting a 
broader right to invite in place, it is fully compatible with my view that this broader right 
should be implemented. 
 
3. The Basic Right to Invite as Part of the Revised First Principle 
 
Rawls’ framework also provides support for the decision to restrict the basic right 
to invite to the set of persons that the society can feasibly commit to treating as legally 
obligatory unification admissions.  Rawls’ first principle holds that each person has an 
equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties where that 
scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all.20  What counts as a fully adequate 
scheme can depend on facts about the society where it is implemented.21  The ability of 
members to bring in their parents, non-adult unmarried children, and spouses will be 
																																																								
20 PL, p. 5.  The equal political liberties are also to be guaranteed their fair value, and 
only these liberties.  In Justice As Fairness: A Restatement, Rawls states the first 
principle solely in terms of basic liberties (see JAFR, p. 42).  However, he clearly still 
includes equal basic rights within the principle, such as the right to vote or hold public 
office, and so this doesn’t mark a substantive change in his view. 
21 The following discussion benefited from Thomas Pogge, John Rawls: His Life and 
Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 82-91. 
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feasible to maintain in the modern democratic societies that Rawls has in mind existing 
under “the circumstances of justice,”22 in particular where there is only moderate scarcity 
of natural and other resources.  On Rawls’ understanding of what it means for a scheme 
of basic rights and liberties to be fully adequate, it must be the case that the rights and 
liberties set out in the scheme do not conflict with one another in ways that are difficult to 
resolve.  The parties to the original position and the real citizens that they represent will 
want to prevent later conflicts, and so mutual adjustments may have to be made when 
giving further content to these rights and liberties in a society’s actual institutions.  Such 
mutual adjustment still must leave the most significant aspects of each right and liberty 
intact and, if needed, only restrict their less significant aspects. 
 Rawls distinguishes between the more and less significant aspects of a given basic 
right or liberty in terms of whether they are tied to the first two fundamental interests that 
he stipulates that citizens possess.23  These are the interests in developing and exercising 
the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity for a conception of the good, which he 
refers to as the two “moral powers.”24  Within a given citizen’s conception of the good 
are an ordering of attachments to persons and associations and a view of the world in 
light of which these attachments are understood.25  The most significant attachments of 
																																																								
22 TJ, pp. 109-112.  Rawls states that his account of the circumstances of justice largely 
follows that of Hume (TJ, p. 109, note 3).  See David Hume, A Treatise of Human 
Nature, eds. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), at bk. III, sec. ii, and David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of 
Morals, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), sec. III, pt. 1. 
23 JAFR, pp. 112-4.  Rawls leaves aside the third fundamental interest, which is the 
interest in being successful in terms of the particular conception of the good that one has.  
For a discussion of this point, see Pogge, John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice, pp. 
86-91. 
24 PL, pp. 59-60. 
25 Ibid., pp. 333-334.  
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persons within this ordering are often to their parents, non-adult unmarried children, and 
spouses, although other persons may be ranked as equal to or higher than these for some 
citizens.  It then makes sense from a Rawlsian perspective for the basic right to invite to 
be restricted so as to grant members the ability to bring in parents, non-adult unmarried 
children, and spouses and not necessarily other non-members.  The development and 
exercise of a citizen’s capacity for a conception of the good will often involve the ability 
to live near or care for these persons.  For citizens whose parents, non-adult unmarried 
children, and spouses are not also citizens, the option to bring them in on the stable basis 
that co-citizenship affords protects this ability.  Attachments to other persons will tend, in 
general, to be somewhat less significant and not require unification.  We may be very 
close to a sibling or friend, but it will generally be less important to safeguard the ability 
to live in the same society as them, even if we would prefer for this to be the case.  Given 
that these other attachments tend to be less significant, their inclusion within the basic 
right to invite would be a less significant aspect of this right and subject to adjustment in 
order to maintain a fully adequate scheme of basic rights and liberties. 
 A Rawlsian rationale, then, can be given for a restricted basic right to invite that 
places a society under an obligation to allow in parents, non-adult unmarried children, 
and spouses of members.  If this circumscribed basic right would be accepted by 
representatives in the original position, we may then ask what else may be due to 
members of society as a matter of justice in terms of the ability to bring in non-members.  
The Rawlsian reasoning for restricting the extent of the basic right to invite derives from 
the need to balance the importance for citizens of being able to bring particular persons in 
with the need to fit this right into a practically implementable set of basic rights and 
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liberties.  It is implausible that the right would endanger the ability to maintain a fully 
adequate scheme of basic rights and liberties as guaranteed by the first principle or other 
particular basic rights and liberties, such as freedom of speech or liberty of conscience 
and thought, when limited in this way.  Whether a broader right to invite would conflict 
with such a scheme is a topic for further inquiry. 
 
4. The Right to Invite and the Second Principle 
 
I just argued that a restricted basic right to invite can fit into a fully adequate 
scheme of basic rights and liberties as guaranteed by the first principle of justice.  A 
further issue concerns whether the addition of the basic right to invite to the first principle 
of justice is implausible in light of the relation between the two principles of justice.  The 
first principle covers the basic rights and liberties of citizens while the second principle 
covers social and economic inequalities.  The first principle is lexically prior to the 
second principle of justice in Rawls’ framework, which prevents tradeoffs from being 
made when infringements of the basic rights and liberties would be justified or 
compensated for by raising the socioeconomic position of the worst off.  The second 
principle includes two lexically ordered principles within it which hold that social and 
economic inequalities (i) must be attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity and (ii) must be to the greatest benefit of the 
least advantaged members of society (the “difference principle”).  Whether the right to 
invite should be included in the first principle depends in part on whether it is plausible 
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that representatives would safeguard the right to invite against tradeoffs that would 
increase the fulfillment of the second principle. 
It is true that some of the other rights and liberties that Rawls lists in his original 
first principle generate cases where many will quickly and strongly judge that we should 
not sacrifice their security for a higher socioeconomic position for the worst off.  It seems 
especially clear that representatives would not choose to allow freedom from 
psychological oppression and physical assault and dismemberment, which Rawls 
subsumes together under “integrity of the person,” to be less secure for the sake of raising 
the socioeconomic position of the worst off.  We may also agree with Rawls that 
representatives would hold that restrictions to freedom of speech cannot generally be 
justified or compensated for by such improvements.  Given that not everyone will have 
non-citizen parents, children, or spouses that they wish to bring in, does this speak 
against securing and protecting the basic right to invite in the same way?  Should the 
representatives of citizens in the original position be willing to tolerate a less secure right 
to invite for the sake of a higher socioeconomic position for the worst off? 
It is worth noting that other rights and liberties that Rawls mentions may be 
subject to similar concerns, in contrast with integrity of the person and perhaps other 
basic rights and liberties within the first principle.  If voter turnout and democratic 
participation in liberal democracies is any indication, it is unlikely that all citizens are 
especially concerned with the security of their right to vote.  This is even more plausibly 
true of the right to hold public office.  Rawls refers to these two rights as components of 
“political liberty” on his list of the basic rights and liberties included in the first principle.  
It would be inconsistent from a Rawlsian perspective to argue that because some citizens 
	 19 
are unlikely to value or exercise a given right or liberty that it should then not be included 
among the basic rights and liberties and secured against tradeoffs.  One might respond by 
noting that it is in every citizen’s interest to live in a society in which all can vote and 
hold public office.  Yet any citizen can wind up in the situation of having to bring their 
parents, children, or spouse into their society.  It is also quite important for them to live in 
a society where all citizens can do so. 
 The basic right to invite will be especially important for citizens with parents, 
children, and spouses that they wish to bring in and cannot simply go and live with in 
other societies.  They may have elderly parents who require care living in the societies 
that they cannot immigrate to, children whom they cannot live with except in their own 
society, or spouses that they cannot share a life with except through unification.  
Increasing the fulfillment of the second principle by restricting the right of other citizens 
to bring in their parents, children, and spouses would ignore the importance of this right 
for the citizens who need to exercise it to unify with these persons.  The representatives 
of citizens should not allow for such tradeoffs as the ability to bring in parents, children, 
or a spouse may be especially important for the citizen that they represent. 
Additional support for this point is provided by the fact that a principle requiring 
that citizens’ basic needs will be met in Rawls’ later statement of his public conception of 
domestic justice is lexically prior to the first principle of justice.26  This principle requires 
society to ensure that the basic needs of citizens are met insofar as their being met is 
required for citizens to understand their basic rights and liberties and be able to fruitfully 
exercise them.  According to Rawls, such a principle must be assumed in applying the 
																																																								
26 PL, p. 7. 
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first principle27 and is a constitutional essential.28  JAF* also treats this principle as 
lexically prior to the first principle and only differs from JAF in virtue of adding the basic 
right to invite to the first principle of justice.  Given this fact, it will not be the case that 
representatives must consider instances where the worst off members of society would 
only have their basic needs met by restricting the right to invite, or other basic rights and 
liberties.  This additional point helps to show that it is plausible that the representatives, 
thinking about restrictions to the right to invite for the sake of greater fulfillment of the 
second principle, would not allow such tradeoffs to be made. 
 
5. The Right to Exit and the Right to Invite 
 
 Another potential objection to my proposal is that there need not be a basic right 
to invite in liberal societies because these societies always grant their citizens the right to 
exit.  This objection falsely presupposes that citizens can always immigrate to another 
society where the persons they wish to invite live.  It will not always be the case, for 
instance, that a gay married couple can rely on the other spouse’s society as a safe 
alternative to live in together.  The society where the other party to a marital or parent-
child relationship lives may be unsafe for any number of reasons.  That region may be 
torn by conflict or war, there may be discrimination against persons bearing other 
qualities that one of the parties to the relationship has, and so on.  It also cannot be 
assumed that a third country can be found that both parties could immigrate to.  The fact 
																																																								
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., p. 166. 
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that there may not be a safe option to immigrate to the prospective invitee’s society, that 
the only path to unification may be through invitation into the society in question, and 
that there may not be a third society to unify with a given non-member in undercuts the 
objection that the basic right to invite is unnecessary due to the ability of members to 
emigrate. 
 In considering this objection, it is helpful to examine the decision that would have 
to be made by the representative of a citizen in the domestic original position.  Suppose 
that they are considering JAF, which does not include a basic right to invite, and JAF*, 
which does.  Should the possibility that the citizen whom they represent would 
potentially be able to move to other societies where the persons whom they want to invite 
make the representative indifferent between JAF and JAF*?  It should not, and the 
considerations just mentioned explain why.  Their citizen might be a member of a 
minority group that has a lot of trouble finding societies where they can live freely, as 
individuals or in their relationships with persons whom they will want to bring in.29  
There may be multiple persons that they wish to bring in from different countries, where 
no other option would allow them all to live together as citizens of the same country.  
And there may not be a third society that will let them in along with the immediate family 
members whom they intend to unify with.  Additionally, the citizen may really value their 
own society’s political culture, social institutions, and their other friends and family 
members who live in the society, and so not wish to leave.  All of these points would 
																																																								
29 These conditions typically go hand in hand for gay people, but are distinct and could be 
separate or of differing levels of severity in certain places.  For instance, there could and 
may in fact be societies where there isn’t a strong social norm against being gay but 
where same-sex partners cannot safely display affection towards one another publicly. 
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push the representative of a citizen in the original position towards JAF* rather than JAF.  
In other words, they would prefer a public conception of justice that included a basic 
right to invite at least some persons over one that did not so long as, as I have argued, 
there are no important downsides to including this right that outweigh its benefits for 
citizens. 
 
6. Situating the Argument for a Rawlsian Basic Right to Invite in Relation to Other 
Responses to Rawls 
 
 Having discussed the place of the right to invite in Rawls’ broader conception of 
domestic justice, I will now describe some of the ways in which my argument differs 
from those that have been offered by theorists responding to Rawls’ conception of the 
divide between domestic and global or international justice and his views on 
immigration.  On the former, Charles Beitz30 and Thomas Pogge31 have argued that 
Rawls’ original position should be extended to global interactions between persons.  
Rawls himself, by contrast, presents the global original position in his later The Law of 
Peoples as a contract between representatives of peoples, or political societies, rather than 
individual persons as he did in constructing his theory of domestic justice, justice as 
fairness.  Pogge32 has also criticized Rawls’ lack of emphasis on the effects of politics 
																																																								
30 Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations. 
31 Pogge, Realizing Rawls. 
32 Thomas W. Pogge, “Assisting the Global Poor,” in The Ethics of Assistance: Morality 
and the Distant Needy, ed. Dean K. Chatterjee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), pp. 260-288; Thomas W. Pogge, “The Incoherence Between Rawls’ Theories of 
Justice,” Fordham Law Review, Vol. 72, No. 5 (2004), pp. 1739-1759. 
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outside the state on domestic justice and the coherence of LP with Rawls’ domestic 
justice theory.  By contrast with these other theorists, I argue that even within the 
domestic original position, issues concerning the treatment of non-citizens emerge, given 
the ties that citizens bear to them. 
 In the ethics of immigration literature, Carens33 prominently offered a Rawls-
inspired argument for open borders that remains an important contribution.  Using a 
global version of the original position, representing people from all over the world, 
Carens argued that representatives behind the veil of ignorance would agree to an open 
borders policy.  Rawls himself, however, did not believe that justice as fairness was 
committed to open borders.  In The Law of Peoples, Rawls states that his views on the 
role of borders and the responsibilities of peoples to manage their territory, its 
environmental integrity, and their population imply that they have a qualified right to 
limit immigration.34  Unlike Carens, I do not hold that Rawls’ theory commits him to 
open borders.  This is, in part, because my view does not require adding non-members as 
parties to the original position, as Carens’ does.  I argue for the Rawlsian basic right to 
invite by considering what representatives in the original position would secure for their 
client citizens. 
 Here a further difference between my approach and these others is brought out.  
Whereas some theorists have argued for extending the Rawlsian original position thought 
experiment to include non-members of society, or non-citizens, I am committed to no 
such extension.  But in theorizing about domestic justice, using Rawls’ framework, I 
																																																								
33 Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders.” 
34 LP, pp. 8-9, pp. 38-9. 
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remove the assumption of Physical Closedness, and so the existence of non-members is 
brought to salience even when thinking about what societies owe to their own members 
alone.  Carens does offer a libertarian line of reasoning for open borders (as well as one 
grounded in utilitarianism), and suggests that anything but open borders limits the 
freedom of members of society to enter into consensual contracts with adult non-
members.  But Carens himself is not a libertarian, and is merely showing that the open 
borders position should be endorsed from a range of political perspectives.  Many will 
also reject this line of reasoning, given its libertarian bearings, and hence Carens makes 
sure to emphasize the appeal of open borders for liberal theorists who share many of the 
commitments regarding social and political justice that Rawls defends. 
 Lister35 has also adopted a Rawlsian view of immigration and, in particular, the 
view that it is a requirement of domestic justice to give equal access to family 
reunification to married same-sex couples.  In a sense, Lister’s approach is closest to 
mine, in that he does not require the original position itself to take on new parties – 
citizens are still the only people represented.  Lister notes that Rawls does not mention 
family-based immigration among the causes of immigration, and holds that this oversight 
explains Rawls’ view that if most societies were just, immigration would nearly cease.36  
However, Lister does not require the removal of the assumption of Physical Closedness 
in the original position.  He believes that the motivation for keeping it in place is to make 
sure that the parties do not pick principles of justice that they might want to skip out on if 
																																																								
35 Lister, “A Rawlsian Argument for Extending Family-Based Immigration Benefits to 
Same-Sex Couples.” 
36 Ibid., p. 759. 
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they end up as one of the less fortunate members of society.37  It seems to me that this is 
the wrong motivation to cite, both textually and theoretically.  For the reasons given 
earlier in distinguishing between Physical and Normative Closedness, it is more likely 
that Rawls’ main motivation was to keep his project tractable, although as I have argued 
here, it will then have to be extended in some way to account for the fact that citizens 
stand in important relationships with non-citizens.  There is little reason to think that the 
possibility of emigration connects with what Rawls has in mind when he mentions the 
need to “fix ideas” by stipulating that the society in question is closed.  Further, because 
liberal theorists are clearly committed to the freedom to emigrate, I cannot see why the 
fact that emigration is not on the table should lead them to be more haphazard in 
choosing principles of justice.  Why should they assume that there will be anywhere else 
to go where they will wind up in a better position?  This move, however, has the further 
consequence that Lister cannot argue for the requirement to honor same-sex couples in 
family reunification in terms of a basic right to invite for all citizens.  He instead holds 
that the representatives of citizens would bring rights to family reunification in at the later 
constitutional and legislative stages.  The requirements implemented at the original 
position stage, however, are treated as central issues of domestic justice.  Rather than 
later additions that may or may not follow on in the later stages where the public 
conception of justice is applied, securing rights to family reunification for all citizens, 
regardless of sexual orientation, should be more deeply enmeshed in the Rawlsian 
framework.  As I have argued, this position matches the importance of the right to invite 
for the higher-order interest fulfillment of some citizens.  It is not a matter for later 
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deliberation, but instead a fundamental part of a Rawlsian egalitarian conception of 
domestic justice, that citizens are guaranteed that they can bring in their parents, children, 
and spouses. 
 
7. The Basic Right to Invite and The Law of Peoples 
 
 Insofar as the argument offered in this paper is meant to remain as consistent as 
possible with Rawlsian commitments, we should also check to see whether there are 
potential conflicts with values or principles that Rawls argues for at the international 
level.  Whereas in the domestic case we were interested in how the basic right to invite 
would fit into a fully adequate scheme of basic rights and liberties for all liberal citizens, 
here we ask whether granting this right would conflict with the interests that Rawls 
regards peoples as possessing. 
 In terms of the equality of Rawlsian peoples with other well-ordered peoples, a 
few points should be made.  First, the notion of equality that Rawls has in mind pertains 
to their standing in the international original position, the Law of Peoples that they select 
through this procedure, and actual international agreements, such as treaties and trade 
agreements.38  Keeping this in mind, it is clear that the interest in equality that 
representatives of peoples are meant to advance, for Rawls, does not rub up against the 
basic right to invite. 
 Second, another separate concern for equality, issued in the spirit of the interest in 
equality perhaps, is worth taking up.  One might be concerned that a Rawlsian people 
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will be disadvantaged with respect to other nations in virtue of implementing this right 
when many others do not.  Knowing that Rawlsian societies recognize a basic right to 
invite, people may tend to want to live in these societies rather than others.  Rawlsian 
societies could then bear disproportionate burdens in virtue of being more desirable 
places to settle in than others.  Yet the basic right to invite only secures the ability of 
existing citizens to bring in their parents, non-adult unmarried children, and spouses.  By 
restricting the basic right to invite in this way, the burdens that it creates will be minimal 
and securing this right, which Rawlsian societies are committed to as a matter of justice, 
will be made feasible. 
 Additional support for this point comes from the fact that there is good reason to 
think that liberal societies more generally are required to secure the ability to bring in 
parents, children, and spouses for their members.  The Rawlsian basic right to invite is 
one way of articulating the requirement to treat parents, children, and spouses as legally 
obligatory admissions.  I want to remain pluralistic about how this requirement is 
understood and conceptualized across different liberal societies.  As long as the 
requirement to let in unification admissions that the Rawlsian basic right to invite 
upholds is plausible on more general liberal commitments, as I argue, concerns for the 
equality of Rawlsian peoples should be mitigated.39  Any burdens associated with 
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implementing the basic right to invite for Rawlsian peoples will be borne by liberal 
peoples more generally. 
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
 
 In this paper I argued that Rawlsian egalitarianism is committed to including a 
basic right to invite among the basic rights and liberties protected by the first principle of 
justice.  This argument also has the implication that Rawls’ methodology of theorizing 
about domestic justice and international or global justice in isolation from one another is 
misguided.  By operating under the assumption of Physical Closedness, Rawls cannot 
examine what representatives in the original position would secure for their client citizens 
in terms of relations these citizens bear to non-citizens.  Even when we leave the 
assumption of Normative Closedness in place, examining a hypothetical agreement on 
principles of justice that only citizens are represented in, representatives of citizens would 
insist on their ability to bring certain non-citizens into the society as new citizens.  In the 
domestic original position, they would secure a basic right to invite parents, children, and 
spouses within the first principle of justice, and hence select a modified version of justice 
as fairness that includes this right (JAF*) over Rawls’ stated version (JAF).  They would 
not treat immigration as a secondary issue of domestic justice, in the sense of being 
addressed only once a public conception of justice for their society was agreed upon, but 
would include this basic right to invite within that conception.  I defended the addition of 
this basic right to invite within the first principle of justice against a number of likely 
objections, and also considered how this right would fit with Rawls’ commitments at the 
	 29 
international or global level.  The argumentative strategy employed in this paper 
therefore also demonstrates the methodological point that we cannot distinguish between 
domestic justice and international or global justice issues as, respectively, the issues that 
directly concern only the treatment of citizens and of non-citizens.  Given the existence 
of relationships between citizens and non-citizens, societal policies and actions 
concerning the treatment of non-citizens may raise issues of domestic justice.  One could 
also investigate topics such as humanitarian giving, disaster relief, trade policies, and 
others in light of the interests that citizens have in their society’s treatment of non-
citizens, but this would go beyond the scope of the present paper.  While immigration and 
the right to invite serve as an important case study here, political philosophers must think 
through these issues more broadly in further research, as the increasingly interconnected 
domains of domestic and international or global justice become more difficult to theorize 
in isolation from one another. 
 
